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By Jared a. ellias
The rise of claims trading is one of the most important changes in bankruptcy practice over the past 30 years. Many critics contend 
that claims trading has made chapter 11 much hard-
er to administer. Chapter 11 is built on the assump-
tion that the debtor will have lengthy and conten-
tious negotiations with creditors that ultimately 
culminate in a consensual settlement and a fully 
supported reorganization plan. 
 However, chapter 11 practice began to drift fur-
ther and further away from this classic paradigm in 
the late 1990s, as, so the story goes, a robust sec-
ondary market developed in the debt and equity of 
chapter 11 debtors. Some creditors decided not to 
negotiate with debtors and instead sold their claims 
to a new type of investor that both helped to cre-
ate the secondary market and grew along with it: 
distressed hedge funds that specialize in activist 
investing in chapter 11. Over the years, there have 
been many calls to change bankruptcy law or prac-
tice to accommodate what many see as a disruptive 
change, including an ABI Journal article.1
 In a recent paper,2 the author conducted the 
first empirical study of the one of the largest mar-
kets for bankruptcy claims: trading in the cor-
porate bonds issued by chapter 11 debtors. The 
study relied on the entire record of bond-trading 
for all chapter 11 debtors that filed for bankruptcy 
between 2002-12, which were then matched to 
important dates and case information from the 
court dockets. The data source used for the study 
has a key limitation, however.3 
 First, a note about the author’s methodology. 
Consider a hypothetical trade of a small amount of 
a bond issued by a debtor prior to the debtor’s bank-
ruptcy. Assume that one hedge fund sells the right to 
receive $100 from the debtor to another investor for 
$10 (or 10 cents on the dollar) on March 1, 2005. In 
the dataset, the author observed the fact that a trade 
of $100 of the debtor’s bond issue happened on 
March 1, 2005, with a sale price of $10. However, 
the author  is unaware of the buyer or seller’s iden-
tity. While this limits the empirical conclusions, 
the data can still be informative about bankruptcy 
claims-trading. 
 This article summarizes some of the study’s 
main findings. As further explained herein, the 
author found that the market for chapter 11 
bonds is very active but perhaps less important 
for the administration of bankruptcy law than 
many critics have feared.
 The chapter 11 bond sample consists of all 
bonds issued by chapter 11 debtors that traded 
while the issuing firm was operating in chapter 11, 
or 389,154 individual trades on 54,536 trading days 
in 494 bonds issued by 204 firms with an aggregate 
face value of $512 billion and an aggregate market 
value of approximately $280 billion. These bonds 
often trade at a substantial discount to par, which 
explains the difference between the face value and 
market value of the trades. As the numbers suggest, 
the chapter 11 bond market is a large market.
 One important question is how active the mar-
ket for chapter 11 debt actually is. While the lit-
erature commonly speaks of a “robust” secondary 
market, it is also common for courts and commen-
tators to assume that chapter 11 debt trades in an 
“illiquid” market. Obviously, both descriptions are 
right some of the time, but the advantage of this 
empirical approach is that it enables the author to 
say on average who is right more often. On aver-
age, 94 percent of chapter 11 debtors that file for 
bankruptcy with outstanding bond debt experience 
trading in their bonds while the firm is in chap-
ter 11. In fact, chapter 11 bonds average among the 
most heavily traded bonds in the corporate bond 
market as a whole. The median chapter 11 bond 
experiences turnover during the bankruptcy case — 
where turnover is defined as the total volume of 
trading scaled by the face value of the bond — that 
places it in the top 15 percent of all outstanding 
corporate bonds. In other words, the median chap-
ter 11 bond trades more actively than 85 percent of 
the corporate bond market. 
 While most chapter 11 bonds are actively traded, 
the sample reveals a wide distribution of trading. 
For the median bond, aggregate trading is equiva-
lent to more than 113 percent of the outstanding face 
value of the bond between the petition date and the 
approval of a reorganization plan. This is not to say 
that 113 percent of petition date holders of the bond 
sold their claim to a new investor. As the author did 
not observe the identity of the traders, one cannot 
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know whether one is observing, for example, three trades of 
approximately 40 percent of the issue with the other 60 per-
cent held by a patient investor, or whether 113 percent of the 
bond issue traded once. 
 The tails of distributions are very different than the medi-
ans, with the 25th percentile bond only seeing 27 percent 
aggregate turnover and the 75th percentile bond seeing more 
than 345 percent aggregate turnover during that same period. 
Thus, while the majority of chapter 11 cases involve heavy 
trading, the level of trading in the most actively traded bonds 
is qualitatively different from the median case.
 Trading also appears, on average, to be the heaviest at 
the beginning of the bankruptcy case. On average, 3 percent 
of an outstanding bond issue trades on every trading day 
between a firm’s petition date and the approval of debtor-in-
possession (DIP) financing. Trading drops sharply, to about 
1 percent of the outstanding bond issue, for every day of the 
case subsequent to the approval of DIP financing, and the 
average level of trading falls again once the disclosure state-
ment has been approved. This pattern of trading suggests 
that, on average, the market for chapter 11 debt is most active 
relatively early in the bankruptcy process.
 An interesting pattern in the data is that trading across 
levels of a firm’s capital structure is relatively uncorre-
lated. To illustrate, consider a firm with senior bonds and 
subordinated bonds. In general, the level of trading in the 
senior bonds does not predict the level of trading in the 
subordinated bonds, and vice versa. On the other hand, 
when multiple bond issues are outstanding at the same 
level of claim priority — for example, two issues of senior 
unsecured bonds — trading in those bonds is highly cor-
related. This pattern suggests that traders tend to focus on 
one level of a firm’s capital structure at any given time. 
Trading does not appear to be statistically significantly 
heavier in the bonds that receive a distribution of equity at 
the end of the bankruptcy case, as opposed to bonds that 
receive a distribution of cash or debt.
 These results demonstrate that there is an active mar-
ket for the claims of chapter 11 debtors, but an important 
question remains unanswered: How much value (if any) are 
selling claimholders giving up by selling their claims? The 
classic story of bankruptcy claims-trading involves the sale 
of claims issued by bankrupt firms from traditional institu-
tional investors to nontraditional investors, such as hedge 
funds, with expertise in bankruptcy. If the result of this trade 
involves a systematic transfer of value to specialized risk-
bearers, it could suggest that the liquidity provided to pre-
bankruptcy creditors presents something of a trade-off. To 
learn more about how selling claimholders fare, the author 
studied the subsample of claims that he could price around 
the petition date and near plan confirmation to measure the 
market value of the distribution the claimholder receives 
under the reorganization plan. 
 To make the comparison more realistic, market-
adjusted returns were calculated for the buyer of claims 
by assuming that the seller reinvests the proceeds of the 
sale in an S&P 500 index fund on the same day that the 
claim was sold and sells the index fund on the day the plan 
is confirmed. The exhibit shows the percentage of trades 
resulting in profit by the year the firm filed for bankruptcy. 
For purposes of this exhibit, each bond in the dataset is 
equally weighted, and the Y-axis shows the percentage of 
all chapter 11 bonds issued by firms that filed for bankrupt-
cy in each sample year that resulted in a market-adjusted 
profit for the buyer. For example, 80 percent of the chap-
ter 11 bonds that traded around the petition date for the 
firms that filed for bankruptcy in 2002 offered market-
adjusted profits to the buyer if the buyer bought the claim 
on the petition date and sold it at the end of the bankruptcy 
process for the then-market price.
 As a threshold matter, the buyers of claims at the begin-
ning of the bankruptcy process only do better than a selling 
claimholder about 61 percent of the time. There also appears 
to be a pattern in the data where hypothetical petition-date 
purchasers do better than sellers when the economy is emerg-
ing from a recession, and sellers do better than purchasers 
when the economy is doing well. This is consistent with 
distressed-debt hedge funds bidding down returns in good 
times, while the sheer supply of distressed debt in bad times 
leads to large profits for skilled investors.
 None of the evidence so far bears on perhaps the most 
important question of all: What does all this activity 
mean for bankruptcy governance? After all, bankruptcy 
law is not terribly concerned with arm’s-length trades in 
bankruptcy claims and whether buyers or sellers do bet-
ter more often. What actually matters is how those trades 
impact the way that chapter 11 is administered. Debtors 
do not generally negotiate with all of the holders of a 
bond issue; they negotiate with the activist investors who 
seek to influence the bankruptcy case. While some large 
investors might buy all of a bond issue on their own, for 
the most part groups of funds participate in the bank-
ruptcy case together as “ad hoc groups.” Rule 2019 of 
the Federal Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure requires these 
ad hoc groups to file disclosure statements identifying, 
among other things, the names of the group members and 
how much they held.
 In order to learn more about how ad hoc groups change 
over the course of chapter 11, the author examined every 
Rule 2019 statement filed by ad hoc groups holding bonds 
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for the firms in the sample.4 The initial sample of Rule 2019 
consists of 100 Rule 2019 statements, of which the median 
statement was filed 42 days into the bankruptcy case — on 
average, around the time that DIP financing was approved.5 
Rule 2019 requires ad hoc groups to file amended disclo-
sure statements when the groups change. Of these initial 
100 groups, 42 of them never filed an updated Rule 2019 
statement. Of the groups that did file updates, the changes 
to group composition and holdings tended to be relatively 
slight, and very few groups changed in a material way over 
the course of the chapter 11. 
 For the updating groups, the group members from the 
original Rule 2019 statement held, on average, 86 percent of 
the debt held by the final group in the last Rule 2019 state-
ment filed with the court, showing that the initial group mem-
bers nearly always remained in control of the ad hoc group 
by the end of the case. Ad hoc groups tend not to acquire new 
members, and the existing members rarely buy additional 
debt during the bankruptcy case.6
 This finding presents a puzzle: How do we reconcile 
the heavy level of trading in bond debt with the fact that 
ad hoc groups tend to enter early and seldom change very 
much by the end of the case? One hypothesis is that the 
claims-trading occurring during a bankruptcy case is much 
more about passive speculation than it is about influenc-
ing the outcome of the bankruptcy case. In other words, 
claims-trading is less a route for activist entrance and exit, 
and more an opportunity for nonactivist investors to make 
passive investments. Of course, some of those nonactivist 
funds might have the ability to become activists if it became 
necessary to defend their claims. Moreover, the mere exis-
tence of a claims-trading market clearly casts a shadow on 
the bankruptcy bargaining table. 
 In addition, the composition of creditor groups on the 
petition date probably reflects the claims-trading that 
occurred prior to the firm’s chapter 11 filing, meaning that 
claims-trading is still important for bankruptcy governance. 
However, the results in this study cast doubt on the argu-
ment that new regulation is needed in order to deal with the 
churn created by claims-trading during the chapter 11 case 
itself — in other words, there appears to be less churn than 
was previously understood.  abi
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4 This method certainly misses the cases where one hedge fund owns nearly all of the bond issue and 
acts on their own, outside of the scaffolding of an ad hoc group. However, those cases are relatively rare, 
and the case where that one investor then sells to another single investor are probably rarer still, so it is 
unlikely that this biases the overall findings in a way that renders them unreliable.
5 There was a slight lag between the ad hoc group’s initial appearance in the case (on average, 24 days 
after the petition date) and the filing of a Rule 2019 statement (on average, 42 days after the petition 
date), so most groups were probably active and negotiating earlier than the initial Rule 2019 disclosure. 6 The study also examined the Rule 2019 statements filed by ad hoc groups holding loans (101 groups) 
and found that these ad hoc groups also showed the same underlying patterns of group stability.
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